Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and (Bio) Ethics by Dickenson, Donna
212 Book reviews
health-related reality of the other"
where the other is recognised as a
"particular" with individual needs,
beliefs, etc. In the end, having ex-
plored the limitations of "caring" as a
sufficient condition here, the author
concludes that "impartiality" is also
required. While an ethic set out in
these terms should be considered
acceptable by both men and women,
additional specification is needed in
the case of women so as to include
attention to the historical circum-
stances of the relations between
women and men, nurses and doctors.
The author's argumentation here
could well be complemented by analy-
sis pertinent to that situation in which
men, as well as women, are members
of the nursing profession. In the US
and Canada, for example, the number
of male nurses is growing; how will
Kuhse's position serve their needs?
Further, and again within the health-
care team-practice context, how will
the two views of an ethic based on car-
ing and impartiality (doctor, nurse) be
reconciled and implemented to the
benefit of all concerned? Can the
approach suggested contribute to de-
velopment of the team's moral author-
ity, not to say development of comple-
mentary roles at bedside and in health
care policy formulation?
3 Kuhse writes that individual
nurses should not only "share formal
responsibility in making end-of-life
decisions with doctors;" they should
also "take responsibility" with refer-
ence to other relevant activity, includ-
ing "provision of voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide".
The social debate on the moral
acceptability of the latter activities
continues; Kuhse's partial reiteration
of it will certainly not be universally
persuasive. As to nurses' role here, a
case could be made that they could
function well within the author's
proposed ethic while yet eschewing
responsibility for provision of these
two activities. Once again, in terms of
decision-making and the activities
proposed above, reference to team
practice, in contrast to that provided
by separate individuals, should be
considered.
4 Kuhse writes that nursing is a
"slumbering giant who lacks the as-
sertiveness and courage to do what,
clearly, it ought to be doing" in
providing appropriate terminal care
for patients.
The author's more general point is
that the profession must work collec-
tively for systemic change so that
nurses will have the formal moral
authority already discussed. In the case
of voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide, this may require further re-
search; in the wider context, concerted
political action will be necessary.
Left unexplored here is the real dif-
ference between any ethical obligation
of an individual nurse and the ethical
obligation of the group to which that
nurse belongs; real difference also
obtains between what may be accept-
able, morally and legally. For other
more compelling reasons the nursing
profession might well refuse to sanc-
tion voluntary euthanasia, even
though individual members of the
profession might be engaged in such
activity. Still, the author's query re-
garding the profession's stance in this
area has merit; it deserves a response.
Overall, the book is well written and
helpful, not least in terms of its careful
notation and extensive bibliography.
Of particular note is the author's con-
tribution to the caring-justice debate,
and her challenges to certain status
quo positions within it. That being
said, further discussion of the relation-
ship between nurses' autonomy and
nurses' membership on health care
teams is urgently required, especially
by North American readers. No
doubt, however, readers' experience
with this volume will raise favourable
expectations regarding the author's
future contributions in this area.
ABBYANN LYNCH








Routledge, 1997, 252 pages,
£45 (hb), £14.95 (pb).
This is a book with several theses, some
necessarily more novel and important
than others. In no particular order-
which is how they emerge in the
book-some of them are as follows:
* (1) Western ethics links moral
agency with transcendent disem-
bodiment and lays great stress on
autonomy;
* (2) Because women are identified
with the body, their agency is there-
fore thought to be impaired, and
their autonomy imperfect;
* (3) This impairment is exacerbated
by male fear of female bodies as
"leaky", as lacking secure bounda-
ries;
* (4) A feminist ethics, drawing on
postmodern and poststructural
thought, will seek to deconstruct
these "secure" categories in favour
of a multiplicity of meanings, actu-
ally welcoming "leakiness" in analy-
sis;
* (5) New reproductive technologies
exemplify the tension between such
a feminist analysis and the closed
world of traditional medical ethics.
Many of these theses arise from
premises which seem inadequately
thought through. For example, (4)
represents a strangely fatalistic form of
biological determinism for a feminist
to adopt. Because women's bodies are
"leaky", must feminist thought be
conditioned by that biological truth?
And of course claim (4) is also prey to
the usual problem about any ontologi-
cal relativism. Shildrick writes that
"truth itself is constructed, not discov-
ered" (page 22)-except, presumably,
that particular truth? In fact Shildrick
wavers between highlighting historical
misconceptions about female
bodies-many of them fascinating, in
passing-and denying that there are
any biological givens. But if there are
no facts in biology, then there cannot
be any misconceptions about the facts.
Shildrick disclaims any intention to
create a narrative structure to her
exposition, so that her postmodern
message becomes the medium as well.
There is nothing particularly new, or
even postmodern about this: Margaret
Fuller chose the same tactic in her
Woman in the Nineteenth Century
(1845). Because the argument of the
book is not coherently sequential, and
because the style is very heavy, the
reader emerges with a sense of frustra-
tion at opportunities lost. Few readers
will stay the course, I fear, particularly
because the intended audience is by
no means clear. Most medical ethicists
will find too little application here, too
much generalisation about the sup-
posed methodological staleness of the
discipline, and far too much unfamil-
iar postmodern theory. Most feminist
theorists will find the discussion of the
postmodern vision of the individual as
subject already familiar from Luce Iri-
garay, Judith Butler and others.
The task of arranging a meeting
of minds between the two-medical
ethics and feminism, including
Book reviews 213
postmodern feminist views of the
subject-has been attempted
elsewhere.' Shildrick's aim is in many
ways the opposite: to stress the
unbridgeable divide between them.
But this requires her to create a straw
man where medical ethics ought to
stand, and to present one principal
strand of feminism-the French-
influenced diffirance [sic] school-as
representative of all feminisms.
There are some interesting byways
in this book, and an admirable level of
ambition. But in the end I was left with
the impression that the mountain had
laboured to bring forth a mouse.
Medical ethics is a far more vibrant
and contested field than Shildrick
realises, and other bioethicists have
already made many of the sceptical
points about autonomy which she
reaches only after considerable ferret-
ing around: for example, when she
says (page 75) that "what I am
suggesting is that the injunction to
respect autonomy can simply act as a
prohibition or limit on certain actions
rather than as a positive move to
embrace the interests of the other in
mutual determination". We know that
already, I think, from the work of
Howard Brody and others, and it has
been said better elsewhere.
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Rosemarie Tong invites readers to
throw caution to the wind. In doing so
she asks non-feminist and feminist
bioethicists to join in a collaborative
effort to create a moral environment in
which truly good medicine can be
practised. This book, in its open and
challenging analysis of ethical theory
goes a long way towards providing a
foundation for the sort of dialogue
needed for such an environment to be
realised.
The work is remarkably crafted and
clear in its descriptive accounts of pre-
dominant feminist and non-feminist
approaches to ethics and bioethics.
Non-feminist theory includes short
descriptions and analyses of various
perspectives including virtue-focused
ethics, utility-orientated approaches,
duty-centred themes, law and
sentiment-orientated ethics. This pro-
vides a valuable context within, and
against, which the author presents
feminist interpretations and analyses.
As such it would make an ideal intro-
ductory text and a helpful course-
book for teachers of undergraduate
ethics. The author challenges the
diversity of interpretation in main-
stream ethics theory. She confronts
those who would dismiss feminist eth-
ics as simply a gender-based inversion
of a more traditional and commonly
patriarchal ethic. Tong demonstrates
through reasoned argument, ways in
which central tenets of traditional
theory are important in an ethics
process and then she takes the reader
skilfully forward to a reinterpretation
of such themes. Her work calls for the
reader, no matter how sceptical, to ask
the essential "woman-question".
What might be the impact of a
decision or direction on women's
lives? How might a situation be articu-
lated with a woman's voice? How are
women's experiences to be under-
stood and differentiated one from
another? What does a situation "say"
about relationships in which decisions
are conceived, and from which they
are derived and ultimately lived out?
The book brings a vitality to such
questions. It gives a comprehensive
account of the plurality of feminist
ethics, rich in philosophical and prac-
tical insight.
Tong sets out to show what makes
feminist ethics distinctive but in her
presentation of alternating non-
feminist and feminist perspectives it is
not clear that this goal is achieved
fully. The approach invites significant
questions about possible overlapping
concepts. The somewhat false di-
chotomy that the style presents de-
tracts from the author's contention
that although feminists are keen to
distinguish their approaches from
those of non-feminists, they do not
wish to reject all those principles, con-
cepts and virtues inherent in a more
traditionally Western approach to eth-
ics. Nevertheless, Tong provides, I
suggest, one of the most readable, rea-
soned and clear accounts of feminist
ethics available.
The practical applications provided
in part two of the book, including
reflections on contraception, sterilisa-
tion, abortion, surrogacy, reproductive
technologies and genetics are insight-
ful. These chapters are written in a
way that at once challenges our appli-
cations of theory to practice, high-
lights significant misconceptions, sug-
gests a possible transferral of feminist
theory to a whole spectrum of
experience and provides a very helpful
basis for a practitioner grappling with
difficult issues in contemporary social
life and health care. An excellent text,
not to be missed by all those interested
in or working in the field of ethics and
bioethics today.
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At Odds with AIDS:
Thinking and Talking
about a Virus
Alexander Garcia Diittmann, trans-
lated by Peter Gilgen and Conrad
Scott-Curtis, California, Stanford
University Press, 1996, 144 pages,
£9.95.
This is a short philosophical presenta-
tion in four chapters about the impact
ofAIDS both positive and negative on
the gay male, in relation to the
individual and his place amongst his
peers as well as in the society in which
he lives. The discussion involves con-
sideration of coming out, dying before
one's time, and grief both for the
infected and their associates, as well as
of gay activism with its concomitant,
violence, vocal as well as physical. You
may agree or disagree and you may be
impressed or otherwise with the schol-
arship portrayed, principally by a
pretty wide ranging use of fairly exten-
sive quotations from other philoso-
phers. To this reviewer, untutored in
Kant, Nietzsche, Sontag, Hollinghurst
and many others referred to it is diffi-
cult to judge the veracity of the
selected quotes or even, in their new
context, their true meaning. This nec-
essarily will limit any readership since
from its very nature this book concen-
trates in lengthy passages on the
